# **Ritchie Carroll** Grid Protection Alliance

# Tim Yardley Erich Heine University of Illinois



# Secure Information Exchange Gateway

### **DOE - Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems**

GPA User's Forum – August 14, 2013

# DOE Project -- SIEGate Secure Information Exchange for Grid Operations

A generalized, security hardened appliance for the exchange of real-time grid operating information.

- Open source
- Productized by Alstom
- Security tested by PNNL
- Demonstrated by PJM
- NERC provides cost share via NASPI project





# SIEGate: Technical Approach and Feasibility

### Current Situation

- Complex communication interactions using multiple protocols, many without security
- Need a unified secure communication mechanism
- Development Approach
  - Security built throughout
    - Defense in depth
  - High Performance
    - Real-time, Built to purpose, Reliable, Flexible



### Multiple Protocols

SCADA, Synchrophasors, File-based

### - Free, Open Source

Accelerated innovation Unencumbered commercialization Proven foundational codebase



# SIEGate: Technical Approach and Feasibility

- SIEGate adds value for grid operators
  - Reduces configuration management costs
  - Improves security posture through a single point of interface
  - Reduces risk of non-compliance



# Two Development Versions

- Engine Development (ED) Version
  - Incorporates a new "advanced core" that improves internal system security
  - Available as source-code for download
  - Currently undergoing refinement and testing
- Feature Development (FD) Version
  - Includes all the features and functionality of SIEGate with the exception of the "advanced core"
  - Ready for use and evaluation within pre-production control center environments
  - Release Candidate 2 posted and available for download and installation



# Feature Development Release Candidate

- Support for Multiple Data Classes
  - Real-time data, e.g., SCADA and phasor data
  - File-based data exchange
  - Notifications for broadcast to all nodes
- TLS Connections for SIEGate data exchange
- Tools to setup trusted SIEGate unions and to automate configuration synchronization
- Many improvements over the openPG in management and configuration
- Built using new .NET 4.5 Grid Solutions Framework



# With Release of "FD" Version of SIEGate, openPG has been retired

- SIEGate provides all openPG functionality and more.
- SIEGate has stronger security and better performance
- SIEGate is actively undergoing additional testing and refinement



# PNNL Testing ("ED" Version)

### Test plan established

- Structured evaluation
  - Code review
  - Data validation
  - Key Management
- Exploratory Tests

### • Review and testing initiated in June 2013



# PJM Demonstration ("FD" Version)

- Demonstration plan developed
  - Bench testing within PJM Lab
  - Data exchange between PJM & GPA
  - Security Testing
  - Optionally, data exchange with others
- Installation scheduled for August 29<sup>th</sup>



# Entergy-TVA-MISO Implementation

- SIEGate (FD) Release Candidate 2 in service at Entergy and TVA as of August 6, 2013
- No issues discovered in installation or configuration
- TVA Gateway configured so that Entergy may subscribe to any of approximately 800 measurements from TVA
- SIEGate installed at MISO and is being configured for exchange of phasor data with Entergy



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### **SIEGate Technical Details**

# SIEGate: Summary

#### Objective

To commercialize an appliance that enables the secure exchange of all types of reliability and market data among grid operating entities and provide a next-generation platform for GPA Open\* products

### Design Approach

- Lower risk by building upon the open source phasor gateway
- Create an extensible platform
- Design security throughout
- Balance real-time and security needs
- Conduct thorough bench tests to identify and fix security defects

#### Technical Goals

- Maintain time-series framework compatibility
- Provide enhanced performance with new core
- Leverage intelligent responsibility separation
- Development Partners
  - Grid Protection Alliance; University of Illinois
- Test and Demonstration Partners
  - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Alstom Grid, and PJM Interconnection



# SIEGate: Technical Design Challenges

#### • Performance given system complexity

- Support multiple data types efficiently and securely
- Support multiple priorities
- Minimize latency and maximize throughput

### • High availability assurance

- Horizontal and vertical scalability
- SIEGate stability and reliability
- Graceful performance degradation

### Security assurance

- Maximize security performance
- Minimize security breach impact
- Configurable security levels
- Security versus simplicity/usability tradeoff





# **Engine Development**

- Adapting SIEGate to core design principles
  - Modular design
  - Single responsibility principle
  - Flexibility for easy adaptation
  - Enhanced security from the ground up
    - Services, Locked-down installation, Hardened OS



# SIEGate: Technical Design Principles

- Minimize thread-locking and contention
- Pre-compute criteria for decisions rather than on-the-fly
- Simplify resource access
- Choose heavy memory usage over heavy CPU
- Discard unneeded data as early as possible
- Provide extensibility & offloading

- Adhere to the single responsibility principle
- Maintain a layered approach to security and defenses
- Design components to operate with least privilege
- Leverage existing, tested components
- Pluggable component
  architecture



# ENGINE DEVELOPMENT DEEP DIVE: MODULARITY IN CORE

### Modular Design Benefits (Development)

### • Increases flexibility

- Allows drop-in replacement of any component
- Modules interface rather than intrude

### Reduces code complexity

- Simplifies dependencies
- Call graph has fewer "cycles"
- Reduces "trampolining" between modules
- Reduces coding errors



# Modular Design





### Decoupling the Data Path from Internal Messaging



### Modular Data Path





### Modular Design Benefits (Security)

- Allows consistent policy application
  - Access control is handled by a single service
  - No inconsistencies between how rules are applied
  - General credential service allows system wide revocation
- Single Responsibility Principle
  - Any defect occurs in only one code location
  - Any new security feature can be applied to everything immediately
- Carefully restricted API to limit access
  - Isolates functionality to minimize attack surface
  - Minimizes information leakage



# Furthering Security via Modularity: Going forward with Engine Development

### Assembly Separation

- Per assembly security capabilities
- Limit code available to the runtime to reduce attack surface
- Composability for deployment specific security choices
  - Public vs. private transport considerations
  - Computation speed vs. data security
- Extensible security modules for enterprise integration
  - Corporate credential managers
  - Network access rules



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### **Deployment Architecture Discussion**

### Legacy SCADA Architecture





### Modern SCADA Architecture





### **Incorporating Phasors**



## Simplifying with SIEGate



SCADA/EMS



### **Basic Overview**





### System Breakdown





### SIEGate Appliance





### **Detailed Architecture**





# Deployment Improvements

### • OpenPG

- Application-based install
- Normal user privs.
- Monolithic architecture

### SIEGate

- Hardened OS
- Composible components
- User account restrictions
- Application and
  Appliance installations
- Windows Server 2008R2 (standard and core)
- Security policies for enterprise integration and audit



### Future: Best Practice Guides

### • Coming soon...

- More granular security policies
- Representative typical architectures
- Guide on security related settings and what they mean for system security

... more (stay tuned)!

